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The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (hereinafter 
referred to as the NMSP or Plan), released by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (CJCS) on February 1, 2006, sets out the Pentagon’s broad strategy for 
executing, and presumably winning, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  The 
NMSP can be viewed as an elaboration of part of the larger and more holistic set 
of policies spelled out by the Department of Defense (DoD) in its June 2005 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.  The Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support envisions a layered approach towards homeland 
defense and security based on a distinction between: Forward Regions, 
Approaches to the U.S., the U.S. Homeland and the Global Commons (space and 
cyberspace).1  Although the NMSP does not specifically position itself within the 
rubric of the larger June 2005 strategy paper, its focus on attacking terrorist 
networks abroad, strengthening international governance and creating a global 
environment inhospitable to terrorists suggest that it should be viewed as a DoD 
articulation of the “Forward Regions” component of the overall strategy.   
This article will focus on the Pentagon’s “Forward Regions” strategy through 
analysis of the NMSP.  The Department of Defense, of course, recognizes that 
combating the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies requires an 
approach that differs in many critical ways from the approaches needed in order 
to effectively carry out conventional warfare and even counterinsurgency warfare.  
An effective homeland security strategy, first and foremost, requires the military 
to “team-up” with civilian intelligence, law-enforcement, and, for specific 
missions, with emergency service and public health agencies as well.  With the 
exception of the National Guard, much of the military is largely unaccustomed to 
this effectively unprecedented role in which the Pentagon must “share power” 
with civilian entities.  The Department of Defense has attempted to cope with this 
quandary by supporting the distinction between “homeland defense” and 
“homeland security.”  A cynic might maintain that this distinction has been 
created in order to enable the Pentagon to retain “ownership” of a major part of 
the overall effort at securing the American homeland from terrorist threats and, 
at the same time, to enable it to play an important role under certain 
circumstances as the lead agency and under others as a supporting agency in 
domestic security and response activities.  Of course, the DoD must also comply 
with U.S. law (which limits the military’s domestic role) and, equally importantly, 
avoid irritating public and congressional sensibilities with respect to the power 
and influence, real or perceived, exercised by the military.  
Potential motives aside, it is doubtful that many would argue that protecting 
the United States from terrorism should not require a holistic approach in which 
the firefighter trained to deal with a possible chemical attack in an American city 
and the special forces soldier trained to attack terrorist hideouts in some remote 
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corner of the globe are viewed as part of the same overall mission.  The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes this continuum in its emphasis on 
prevention, reduction of vulnerability to attacks that do occur, and swift recovery 
from attacks.2  Homeland Defense and Homeland Security should not, therefore, 
be viewed as different strategies, but rather different ends of a continuum that 
moves from the international arena, to the North American land-mass (and 
associated offshore areas), to the domestic arena.   
Nevertheless, if we attempt to somewhat artificially separate Homeland 
Defense from Homeland Security, we are still confronted with a lack of clarity as 
to the precise role the military must play.  The DoD’s Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support places the military in the lead role with respect to 
“defending the maritime and air approaches to the United States and protecting 
U.S. airspace, territorial seas, and territory from attacks.”3  However, civilian 
agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration and the Department of 
Homeland Security (via Customs and Border Protection or the U.S. Coast Guard), 
as well as municipal police departments and county sheriff’s departments in 
border areas, would also be involved in responding to a terrorist attack in 
American airspace or across a land or maritime border.  Furthermore, it is 
entirely conceivable, particularly with respect to terrorist attacks across land or 
maritime borders, that non-DoD agencies will not only be the first to respond to 
such attacks, but may also bring those incidents to their conclusion before the 
military arrives.   
Ostensibly, there is one area of the overall homeland security-homeland 
defense continuum that lies purely within the military’s purview: overseas 
missions.  Here too, however, upon closer inspection, the picture becomes 
decidedly less clear-cut.  Fighting terrorism abroad can be viewed primarily as a 
warfighting activity and, to the degree that it is such, clearly falls within the 
purview of a purely military activity (though reports of CIA commandoes 
operating during Operation Enduring Freedom in late 2001, as well as the global 
activities of various defense contractors, suggest that even here the military does 
not enjoy a complete monopoly).  Fighting terrorism abroad, can also be viewed 
as a law-enforcement activity – as it is with respect to coping with terrorist 
threats emanating from the territory of America’s allies (such as those in Europe) 
or other states operating within the rule of law as legitimate members of the 
international community.  In this context, the military can, at best, play only a 
minor supporting role.  Moreover, as will be discussed below, addressing the 
terrorist threat in a truly comprehensive manner requires focusing on efforts and 
delineating policies in areas in which the military has traditionally played little or 
no role and for which it is unclear that the military possesses or intends to build 
the capabilities to address these issues. 
The upshot of the above argument is that the military, in trying to stake out a 
role in homeland security, homeland defense and overseas counter-terrorism 
efforts, has created what is likely to be an impossibly broad and multifaceted 
“operational area” requiring expertise and experience in so many different modus 
operandi and environments that the Pentagon may be placing itself in danger not 
only of doing a poor job in areas for which it lacks experience and expertise, but 
also of losing its core competency skills in the process.  In looking strictly at 
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overseas efforts, the NMSP mirrors some of these problems in that it spells out a 
very broad mission statement, far beyond core military competencies, for coping 
with overseas terrorist threats. 
The NMSP is laudable in that it shows an understanding that the terrorist 
threat is multifaceted and that it encompasses not only military, but political, 
social, economic, cultural and educational components.  However, despite the 
sophistication of its analysis of the problem, the NMSP contains a number of 
internal contradictions and, more critically, is both unachievable and takes the 
initiative out of the hands of the U.S. military on the one hand, while on the 
other, tasks the military with a broad range of largely non-military missions.  This 
article will focus on three central problems and suggest an alternate strategic 
approach and role for the military likely to be significantly more successful and 
allow it to fulfill a clearer role within the overall homeland security-homeland 
defense continuum. 
 
PROBLEM # 1: Goals Unclear and Unrealistic 
The Plan sets out the policy goal of defeating violent extremism and creating a 
global environment inhospitable to terrorists.4  While this is unquestionably a 
desirable goal, it is not fundamentally realistic and sets the bar too high with 
respect to any achievable outcomes for the GWOT.  It is highly unlikely that the 
GWOT will succeed in defeating and/or eradicating violent extremism as a threat 
to the United States for the foreseeable future and even more unlikely that the 
global environment can be made inhospitable to violent extremists to the degree 
that they will be substantially curtailed.  The intensity and scope of terrorism may 
ebb and flow over time due to a range of factors, including effective counter-
terrorism policies, but a complete negation of the present Jihadist terrorist threat 
will, under the most optimistic scenario, take several decades at the least (by 
which time new terrorist threats may well have emerged).   
To illustrate the tenacity of the terrorist phenomenon one need only turn to 
the Northern Ireland example.*  The so-called “Real IRA’s” attack in Omagh in 
August 1998 (the single worst terrorist attack carried out in Northern Ireland 
since the start of the “Troubles,” the attack resulted in twenty-nine fatalities and 
over 300 injuries) serves as one illustration of the tenacity of the terrorist 
phenomenon in the face of profound and multifaceted efforts made in the 
political, diplomatic, and military spheres to weaken popular support for terrorist 
organizations and undermine the infrastructure of those organizations.  Despite 
the ostensible “evolution” of Republican (and Unionist) groups away from 
terrorism and towards political dialogue, as represented by the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement, and despite the findings of the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning under General Sir John de Chastelain in 
September 2005 that the IRA has put its weapons “beyond use,”  Britain’s 
Security Service (MI5) was reportedly ordered in May 2006 to devote twenty 
                                                
* Examples of this abound, including the FARC, the PKK, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups who 
have been the subject of intensive counterterrorism activities and yet continue to pose a threat.  Space 
limitations, however, preclude the provision of additional examples to further substantiate this point. 
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percent of its already- overstretched resources to disrupting the activities of 
Republican splinter groups in Northern Ireland.5     
Consequently, while governments may adopt multifaceted approaches to 
dealing with the terrorist threat and may be able, over the span of several 
decades, to significantly impact terrorist organizations and even force some of 
them to abandon the “armed struggle,” there is still no guarantee that even more 
extreme splinter factions breaking off of those organizations will not continue to 
act. Moreover, as technology advances, significant acts of terrorism may be  
executable by increasingly smaller terrorist infrastructures and it would thus 
clearly be naive to assume that small groups of people wanting to do harm to the 
United States will no longer be a part of America’s threat environment in the 
future. 
Since the launching of the GWOT, the State Department’s Counterterrorism 
Office has indeed documented a reduction in the number of casualties from 
global terrorist attacks from 5,806 in 2001 to 3,072 in 2002, though the number 
subsequently increased to 4,192 in 2003.6  Leaving aside questions relating to the 
problematic nature of the methodology used by the State Department in 
documenting terrorist attacks, it is nonetheless clear that there is no evidence to 
point to a trend towards significant decreases in terrorism.  Admittedly it has 
been fewer than five years since the current campaign against terrorism was 
launched and thus it is difficult to predict its ultimate outcome (which is likely to 
be several decades away).  Nevertheless, if the Pentagon proposes a strategy 
geared towards the destruction of terrorism, one would expect that it should have 
a fairly clear idea as to whether or not that outcome is achievable and what is 
patently obvious at present regarding the GWOT is that no individual today can 
reasonably predict the outcome of what American leaders, from the President on 
down, have consistently portrayed as a long war.  Whether or not said terrorism 
constitutes a threat to the “American way of life” as well as the existence of a “free 
and open society” in the United States is unclear as these concepts are not clearly 
defined by the CJCS in the NMSP.   
Since September 11, 2001, there has been only one documented domestic 
terrorist attack (against passengers at the El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles 
International Airport on July 4, 2002 carried out by a “lone wolf” terrorist with 
no known connections to al Qaeda) as well as a few interdictions of suspected 
terrorists.  The overall paucity of attacks or attempted attacks would seem to 
suggest, given the presumably continued high motivation on the part of terrorists 
to attack the American homeland, that the threat of terrorism has substantially 
decreased within the United States.  However, terrorism still constitutes a serious 
threat to American military personnel, American interests, and U.S. allies 
worldwide – and these may be considered, by some, to be important components 
in the process of maintaining the “American way of life.”  It is also possible, for 
example, that the current “Jihad” in Iraq is acting as a lightning-rod of sorts in 
drawing Salafist recruits keen on killing Americans (military and civilian) in that 
direction, rather than towards American shores. Of course, no one can say for 
sure whether the war in Iraq has actually heightened security in the American 
homeland or potentially decreased it, due to the radicalization of larger numbers 
of Muslims in Iraq and elsewhere in the wake of the U.S. invasion.  At any rate, an 
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eventual U.S. withdrawal may free up significant numbers of Salafists for future 
attacks on the United States itself.     
Ultimately, regardless of the situation in Iraq, there are no guarantees that the 
American homeland will continue to be largely free of attacks and the CIA has 
reportedly indicated that it considers a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, or high-yield Explosive (CBRNE) terrorist attack within the United 
States to be highly probable.7   Additionally, with al Qaeda and its affiliates 
maintaining cells worldwide, increased terrorism in Europe (e.g., the Madrid and 
London attacks), and the strong electoral showing of Hamas in the West Bank 
and Gaza, extremist Shi’a factions in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 
one can hardly deduce that the global environment has become substantially less 
hospitable to terrorists.  It is also unclear as to what criteria the CJCS is using to 
define the term “inhospitable.”  If that term is taken to mean that terrorists the 
world over will suffer from a lack of popular support and be constantly and 
consistently hunted down by government security forces, then, as the 
aforementioned examples illustrate, this goal is far from being achieved. 
Policy-makers in the Pentagon and elsewhere who desire to follow a realistic 
approach will be better served by not framing their counterterrorism policy in 
stark and unequivocal terms such as “defeat[ing] violent extremism” or creating 
an “inhospitable” global environment for terrorists.  There is little logic in setting 
policy goals that are unattainable, however well-meaning they are.   If one were to 
take a cynical approach and view the NMSP exclusively through the 
“Bureaucratic Politics” lens, one might conclude that the CJCS has drafted this 
strategy solely for the purpose of convincing Congress, the White House and the 
American people that the military needs to enjoy enhanced budgeting and greater 
political and operational freedom of action.  Viewed in this context, the document 
makes sense because it suggests that the military can and will actually win the 
GWOT and that the military has the capabilities to operate in a wide range of 
contexts – traditional and non-traditional – thus both reinforcing the military’s 
argument for increased funding and its argument for making the military the lead 
agency and centerpiece in the homeland security-homeland defense continuum.  
It would, however, require a highly suspicious mind to conclude that institutional 
and budgetary interests are, in fact, the main motivating factors behind the 
issuance of the NMSP.  The DoD, like any other bureaucratic entity, is interested 
in strengthening its resources and its power relative to competing agencies.  Yet 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Pentagon would risk putting forth a 
strategy of great significance for the country, based on Machiavellian 
considerations of narrow institutional interests.  This would require assuming 
that leadership in DoD, from the Secretary of Defense on down, was highly 
selective in its form of patriotism as well as reckless.  Moreover, such an 
approach would be extremely risky because if the true motivations were to come 
to light (and leaks have not been unheard of at the Pentagon), this would severely 
undermine the credibility, not only of the leadership at DoD, but of the entire 
military establishment.  Finally, the NMSP itself points to the need for a 
partnership between the military and civilian agencies and hence, while putting 
the military in a central role, does not appear to promote a DoD monopolization 
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of the war on terrorism.  It seems, at least to the author, that the strategy has to 
be taken at face value and judged based on the logic and realism of its approach.   
The most critical problem, therefore, with taking an unrealistic approach to 
designing a counterterrorism policy is that real and effective efforts to reduce 
terrorism (as opposed to defeating it) may be undermined in the public 
perception because the overall goal of the policy has not been achieved.  And it is 
clear that the phenomenon of terrorism is very much a public relations-focused 
phenomenon as both the terrorists and the government find themselves 
effectively waging a conflict for public opinion.8  To the degree that the public 
perceives itself to be reasonably safe, the government’s policies will be seen as 
successful.  Consequently, success in countering terrorism can be measured by 
the degree to which the public feels safe from terrorism.  This sense of safety has 
important ramifications for economic activity and other parameters by which a 
society may be judged capable of coping with terrorism.9   
Clearly, the public will feel completely safe if terrorism is truly eradicated, but 
as this is not a realistic proposition (given the fact that disgruntled persons are a 
constant and technology is increasingly empowering small groups of such 
persons) policy-makers are best advised to find the ways and means to bolster the 
public perception that the government is working to enhance their security rather 
than promising the public something it cannot deliver.  For this reason, it is also 
highly unlikely that the NMSP was drafted purely as a public relations document 
designed to create a popular sense of safety because if that was the primary 
reason behind its creation, this would represent an extremely risky and 
fundamentally illogical public relations strategy. 
From a public relations perspective, it is preferable to provide honest and 
accurate information to the public – even if that information is not completely 
reassuring – than to paint a rosy picture that proves to be completely wrong 
(when the almost inevitable terrorist attacks occur) and results in the military 
losing its credibility in the eyes of the public.  Such an outcome can only serve the 
terrorists by driving a wedge between the authorities and the population and 
encouraging mass hysteria, economic crisis and, in very extreme cases, the 
possible breakdown of governmental control. 
One final note on this point:  it is clear that only a tiny minority of Americans 
will ever read the NMSP. Therefore one might argue that promises galore may be 
made as no one will take the Pentagon to task for failing to achieve the goals 
spelled out in the NMSP, nor will this have much of an impact on Americans’ 
collective sense of security.  While it is undoubtedly true that the great body of 
Americans will remain ignorant by choice regarding specific strategies for waging 
the GWOT and securing the homeland, one cannot comfortably assume that the 
perhaps five to ten percent of Americans who have a real impact on life in the 
United States (prominent elected officials, economic elites, key bureaucratic 
players, members of the news media, the rare academic, and the occasional movie 
star) will remain ignorant of these strategies – particularly if they fail.  Moreover, 
while the general public may not be particularly interested in questions of 
strategy, they clearly do expect the military to protect America from terrorists.  If 
the United States falls victim to a sustained campaign of terrorism, the above 
groups, as well as growing numbers of the general public, are likely to perceive 
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the military as ineffectual and this may produce a crisis of credibility that could 
“trickle down” to society at large. 
 
PROBLEM # 2: Policy Implementation Primarily Dependent on Non-
DoD Entities 
In order to achieve the goal of defeating terrorism in the homeland and creating a 
global environment inhospitable to terrorism, the CJCS suggests that the 
Pentagon can only succeed in this mission through cooperation with other U.S. 
governmental agencies (presumably also with state and local agencies, though 
this is not explicitly clear in the language used) and with foreign governments.  
The DoD is accordingly authorized to work in cooperation with other American 
governmental entities and foreign partners to (1) thwart or defeat terrorist 
actions against the U.S. and its allies, (2) attack and disrupt international 
terrorist networks abroad, (3) deny terrorists access to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, (4) assist other countries in combating terrorism and denying 
terrorists safe havens in their national territory, and (5) creating a global 
environment inhospitable to terrorism.10   
Some of the above missions are unclear with respect to their scope or their 
intention.  For example, “thwart[ing] or defeat[ing] attacks against the U.S. and 
its allies” suggests that the Pentagon plans to militarily intervene in a wide range 
of terrorist “theaters of action” including many that are not directed at the United 
States, but rather at its allies.  This would seem to imply, therefore, that the 
Pentagon plans to fight groups as disparate and geographically dispersed as 
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers, Abu Sayyaf, 
the Real IRA, the followers of Shamil Basayev in Chechnya, and the like.  As it is 
doubtful that the Department of Defense is really planning to “declare war” on 
disparate terrorist organizations worldwide, suggesting that this is United States 
policy is likely to mislead allies and create unrealistic expectations as to the scope 
of the GWOT as well as its targets.  To provide just one example, it appears that 
Indo-Pakistani tensions, which almost led to the outbreak of war between the two 
nations in December 2001, were related to, on the one hand, India’s expectation 
that Pakistan’s support for Kashmiri separatist terrorism would put Pakistan 
within the camp of U.S.-defined terrorism supporters, thus bringing full U.S. 
support to bear behind India.  On the other hand, Pakistan apparently believed 
that its centrality with respect to the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda meant 
that the United States would back Islamabad in its conflict with New Delhi.11 
In addition to the issue of possible ally misunderstandings, should the United 
States fail to subsequently engage these disparate terrorist organizations, after 
seemingly having declared war on them, Washington will likely be viewed by 
international terrorists as weak, thus strengthening the belief among al Qaeda 
affiliates and others that the United States is not really capable of defeating global 
terrorism.  As matters stand now, even without the possibility that the Pentagon 
has unwittingly created a misleading perception as to the organizations to be 
targeted in the GWOT, al Qaeda has been claiming that American involvement in 
Afghanistan and Iraq has weakened the United States irreparably (and this when 
the organizations targeted by the U.S. in those countries have represented a 
fraction of global terrorist movements).12  Consequently, the creation of a 
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perception and expectation that the U.S. will fight all terrorists without exception 
will simply play into the hands of terrorists who, for purposes of political 
prestige, recruitment and the like, are working to portray the United States as 
weak and the GWOT as an abject failure. 
Another problematic element of the strategy has to do with the commitment, 
outlined in the Pentagon plan, to assist other countries in fighting terrorism and 
preventing their national territory from being used as a safe haven for terrorists.  
This represents an extremely significant commitment on the part of the U.S. 
military.  A broad range of “failed states,” “failing states,” or otherwise weak and 
misgoverned states exist in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia.  
Moreover, many advanced, post-industrial states – the United States included – 
cannot guarantee complete control over their own homeland and are unable, with 
any degree of certainty, to guarantee that terrorists cannot operate from their 
territory.  Consequently, this policy implies a profound commitment in resources 
(economic and military) to a large number of countries.  There seems little doubt 
that terrorists are invariably on the lookout for failed states in which they can set 
up an infrastructure and the United States must clearly take this fact into 
account, as President Bush noted in his first National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.13  However, building a policy around the goal of assisting states in 
preventing terrorists from operating in their territory is so ambitious as to be 
largely unrealistic.  This may work to some degree in specific cases, such as with 
respect to the Philippines, but it is not likely to be successful on a significant scale 
given limited resources.14  As in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United 
States military has been unable to deny terrorists the use of at least some of the 
territory of those countries as operational safe havens.  Moreover, the cost of 
rebuilding Afghanistan has been estimated in the billions of dollars and the U.S. 
may be called upon to cover some one quarter of rebuilding costs for failed states 
such as Sierra Leone, Angola, Congo, Somalia, and Sudan (estimated at between 
$750 million and $3.75 billion over five years).15   
Two final examples will suffice to provide a sense of the daunting task of 
coping with the possible security threats emanating from failed states.  At 
present, sixteen of the eighteen United Nations peacekeeping or peace-building 
operations worldwide take place in failed or failing states with close to 90,000 
UN personnel involved in such missions.  For the present fiscal year, the cost of 
these missions has been estimated at $5.03 billion.16  The United Nations, 
moreover, is not the only agency involved in the peacekeeping business.  The 
West African Peacekeeping Force (ECOMOG), which has been in existence since 
1990, has been deployed to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau and has 
been instrumental in bringing at least partial stability to these failed states – yet 
the cost has been high.  In 2001, Nigeria, the largest contributor to the force, 
estimated that it has spent some $13 billion on ECOMOG since its creation.17  It 
should be borne in mind, furthermore, that these international peacekeeping 
operations fulfill a tiny fraction of the overall need for policing and stability in a 
wide variety of failed states, most of which can be used, in one form or another, 
as effective bases for global terrorism.   
Adding to the extremely problematic nature of the National Strategy is the 
fact that all of the above missions for the GWOT require significant, and in many 
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cases, primary, efforts to be made by non-DoD entities (whether U.S. 
governmental agencies at the federal, state, and local levels or foreign 
governments). This also makes the policy largely unrealistic because it is 
predicated, in essence, on the full cooperation of a broad range of American and 
international governmental entities.  Even in the highly unlikely event that this 
“coalition” of entities can be assembled, there is not likely to be agreement as to 
which agency should take the lead (not to mention which country).   Moreover, if 
the United States feels sufficiently threatened, it is not likely to want to encumber 
itself with a multilateral international response.  And, for that matter, the 
Pentagon is likely to want to maintain control of the response and not have to 
share decision-making authority with other federal agencies.  Take Operation 
Enduring Freedom, the assault on the Taliban in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, 
as an example. At European urging, NATO (invoking Article V of its founding 
treaty) declared that an attack on the United States was an attack on all member 
states, yet the United States largely bypassed the alliance in favor of what was a 
primarily unilateral action.18  
Quite a number of countries are involved in different aspects of the GWOT and 
each operates autonomously and with its own set of interests.  Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia, to name just two countries, clearly have very different objectives and 
interests in fighting global Jihadism; to expect both to follow American priorities 
and interests is simply impracticable.  Moreover the problem is not just an 
international one.  Within the United States, the GWOT (in its Homeland 
Security context) is “fought” overwhelmingly by law enforcement entities – most 
of whom are local governmental entities.  A host of legal and resource issues 
ensure that the U.S. Northern Command plays a largely marginal role in domestic 
counterterrorism. Beyond this, the myriad of diplomatic, informational, 
economic and financial counterterrorism efforts is largely not within the purview 
of the military, this despite the fact that the military has, through the NMSP, 
established that its policy is predicated on success in these areas as well. 
Consequently, by establishing the above goals as its policy objective, the 
Pentagon is putting itself in a position of weakness because it will be unable to 
achieve, on its own, objectives that are essentially dependent on the goodwill and 
cooperation of other entities, foreign and domestic.    
 
PROBLEM #3: Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism is Not a 
Feasible Goal 
The National Military Strategy puts much emphasis on its assertion that 
ideological support for terrorism constitute the enemy’s “strategic center of 
gravity,” and that the military can help undermine such support through: (1) 
creating a secure environment for political moderates (presumably in countries 
where such moderates face intimidation in the face of support for terrorists), (2) 
demonstrating goodwill through humanitarian assistance, (3) strengthening 
military-to-military contacts in order to influence foreign leaders in their 
counterterrorism policies, (4) conducting operations abroad in a manner that 
does not offend the sensibilities of foreigners, and (5) strengthening the voices of 
moderates abroad through information operations.19   
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While the document does acknowledge that the military is not likely to be the 
lead agency in this area, it nevertheless sets goals, in partnership with other 
federal agencies, that will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet.  Most students of 
terrorism acknowledge that in order for terrorism to be effective, it requires a 
minimal base of popular backing in the form of passive and active cadres of 
supporters or, using the systems analysis model, a series of mutually 
interdependent concentric rings moving from the hard-core leadership to various 
levels of sympathizers fulfilling a myriad of support and infrastructure 
functions.20  It is therefore clear that terrorists will have a significantly more 
difficult time operating in a hostile public environment and a number of cases 
have shown that terrorist groups will sometimes change tactics when faced with a 
possible significant drop in support among traditional groups of supporters.21  
Consequently, the goal of encouraging political moderates in countries in which 
terrorists derive popular support is unquestionably praiseworthy.  The problem is 
that it is not clear how this will be accomplished and whether the Pentagon, in 
cooperation with or independent of other federal agencies, possesses the 
wherewithal to achieve this objective.    
The creation of a secure environment for moderates throughout the Middle 
East, to take what is perhaps the most problematic region in this context as an 
example, requires a mind-boggling investment in resources and manpower.  
Among the many measures that such a policy is likely to require are: (1) the 
provision of significant military forces to maintain law and order in the absence 
of the ability and/or willingness of the host country to provide a physically safe 
environment for moderates (something that does not exist in Iraq today despite 
the current deployment of some 150,000 U.S. troops in that country), (2) the 
revamping of educational systems in most Middle East countries in a manner 
that will encourage the teaching of moderation and democratic principles and 
eschew time-honored religious and societal values, (3) the creation of democratic 
political systems that encourage political moderation and moderate debate, and 
(4) the creation of a significant upwardly-mobile middle class that can act as a 
repository of moderation and democratic values.  In short, the task is daunting to 
say the least – so daunting in fact, as to be wholly quixotic.  Moreover, such a 
policy would clash with the fourth policy goal: conducting foreign operations in a 
manner that is politically, socially, and culturally acceptable to the target 
populations.  The deployment of significant numbers of U.S. troops in order to 
provide security for political moderates is not likely to endear the United States 
to those target populations and not likely to foster credibility for the kind of 
moderate and democratic values that the policy aims to encourage and solidify.  
Similarly, the creation of U.S.-funded, or at least U.S.-vetted, educational systems 
is highly likely to be seen (given the current environment of mistrust, if not 
outright hostility, towards the United States) as a form of American “cultural 
imperialism” and consequently has a very low probability of success.   
The National Strategy also suffers from inherent contradictions in that, on the 
one hand, it tasks the military (albeit in cooperation with other federal agencies) 
with the job of creating a supportive environment for moderates in the Islamic 
world and yet, on the other hand, recognizes that support for moderation and the 
eschewing of violence and terrorism must come from the Muslim inhabitants of 
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these countries.  The Islamic world is expected to “progressively recognize… 
[that] violent extremist actions… [are]…a threat to itself through introspection” 
(emphasis added).22  It is not clear whether the National Strategy envisions that 
introspection to come about as a result of introducing U.S. “boots on the ground” 
in those countries (in order to provide security to moderates and thus foster a 
climate of debate and introspection) or whether it will come about through active 
hostilities that will cause sufficient hardship to Muslims that they will realize the 
“error of their ways” and, through introspection, reach the conclusion that the 
path of moderation is best.   
It thus appears that the “bottom line” of the CJCS’s National Military 
Strategy for the War on Terrorism is that the success of U.S. counterterrorism 
policy is dependent on the willingness of the Islamic world to overcome the 
powerful attraction of Salafist Islam.  By essentially suggesting this, the Pentagon 
has absolved itself of ultimate responsibility for effectively fighting terrorism as 
the military is not likely to be a successful agent for change at the grassroots level 
in the Islamic world.   Yet at the same time, the CJCS has set the initiation of this 
change, and the subsequent expected reduction in, or eradication of, terrorism as 
a central policy goal for the military. 
 
 
LIMITING GOALS TO ACHIEVE RESULTS 
The NMSP’s primary flaw is that it sets out policy goals that are highly 
impractical and ultimately largely unachievable.†  In so doing, it will not only 
embolden America’s enemies when the United States invariably fails to achieve 
those policy goals, but also will create unrealistic expectations among allies and 
the American public (or at least the more prominent segments within it).  The 
danger here is that not meeting those expectations will create a sense that the 
government and military are losing the war on terrorism because central policy 
goals set out by the military are not being met.  Furthermore, due to the highly 
psychological nature of terrorism, if Americans become convinced that the 
United States is losing the war on terrorism, the United States will, in effect, have 
lost.  Even in the case of conventional wars, public sentiment can play a crucial 
role (many historians point to the fact that the U.S. lost the Vietnam War in the 
court of public opinion and not on the battlefield).  What is true for a 
conventional war is true even more so for the Global War on Terrorism.   
                                                
† While one might argue that the goals set out in the NMSP do not have to be achieved simultaneously and 
therefore some of the objectives may meaningfully be addressed first and others later, a closer look at the 
strategy shows that progress in one area is dependent on parallel progress in other areas.  The NMSP in fact 
refers to elements of the strategy being buttressed by “cross-cutting enablers” (i.e., factors that affect all of 
the components of the strategy).  For example, attacking terrorists abroad, one of the components of the 
strategy, requires expanding foreign partnerships, strengthening capacity to prevent terrorist acquisition of 
CBRNE, and institutionalizing international strategies against terrorism – all of these being cross-cutting 
enablers.  Consequently, the policy being proposed resembles a matrix in which forward movement 
requires advancement both in the components of policy and in the so-called cross-cutting enablers.  This, in 
fact, largely precludes the option of focusing first on only a few components of the policy and then moving 
forward on others. 
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Some may argue that the DoD should purposefully set out goals that are more 
“aspirational” in nature – in other words, goals that one does not expect 
realistically to achieve, but that outline the vision and direction policy should 
take.  It is intuitive that policymaking without vision lacks coherence and 
cohesion.  Viewed within this rubric, the NMSP might not be seen as quite so 
problematic.  However, the need for vision does not mean that all policy 
documents at all levels should incorporate so-called aspirational goals.  In this 
instance, the vision for defeating global terrorism would probably best be 
expressed at the White House/NSC level (rather than at the level of those who are 
more frequently tasked with implementing policy) and when it is expressed by 
the president, should be clearly labeled as “aspirational,” “long term,” “visionary,” 
and the like, so as not to create the impression that is within the country’s 
immediate grasp. 
Given the above, in order to develop a credible and realistic strategy for 
dealing with terrorism, the military should play to its strengths and comparative 
advantages.  The military establishment’s primary role is to apply physical power 
in order to achieve national objectives.  In this case, this means that the military 
focuses on the physical disruption of terrorist networks and the apprehension or 
liquidation of individual terrorists.  The NMSP correctly spells out these goals 
and notes that they are a major part of the military’s mission,  but then it goes 
into unfamiliar territory, for the military, by dealing with overtly non-military 
issues as well as ones in which the DoD subordinates itself to other domestic 
agencies and/or foreign countries.  The American public can legitimately and 
realistically expect the military to be competent and effective (though not 
necessarily successful 100% of the time) in counterterrorist efforts within the 
purely military sphere.  Why, then, should the Pentagon willingly embrace 
“mission creep” and dive head-and-shoulders into complex and muddled 
economic, financial, cultural, educational, etc. issues that relate to broader 
societies?  The military is infinitely more prepared and competent to arrest or kill 
terrorists and destroy their bases than it is to change values, societal structures, 
and political regimes.  It is immeasurably better to produce a successful limited 
policy than a failed all-encompassing one.  As with any illness, it is always better 
to treat the root causes, but some diseases are presently incurable and the best 
way to manage them is by addressing their symptoms.   
The Pentagon should also understand that it cannot stand aside and put the 
impetus for change on others – particularly societies that are not predisposed to 
view the United States, or Western values and culture in general, in a positive 
light.  If the success of the military’s counterterrorism efforts is dependent on 
fundamental change being initiated by Muslims from within the Islamic world, 
then the military has willingly abrogated its control of the situation and virtually 
ensured that its policy (barring any sudden, dramatic democratization of the 
Islamic world – something which is a distinctly unlikely eventuality) will be seen 
as a failure.  This will ultimately create serious misgivings within American 
society and produce the opposite of what the military is trying to achieve.  Instead 
of strengthening America’s security (through creating a strong public sense of 
security) the military will have unwittingly contributed to undermining that 
security.   
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In sum, the National Military Strategy for the War on Terrorism should be 
just that: a military strategy, not a political, economic, or social one.  The 
argument presented here does not suggest that the elements of “Soft Power” 
referred to in the NMSP (such as economic, cultural, educational, and attitudinal 
issues) do not need to be addressed or that they are not desirable components 
(allowing for the fact that some are more aspirational in nature and others more 
concrete) of an overarching counterterrorism policy.  Rather, the author takes 
issue with the military taking “ownership” of this strategy because the military is 
far more qualified to address the elements of “Hard Power” (in this case, 
attacking terrorist bases overseas and the regimes that harbor them) than it is in 
addressing these other issues. 
Whether Americans and other Westerners care to admit this or not, Jihadist 
terrorism is likely to be a reality for some time to come and there is probably little 
the United States can do to fundamentally alter the status quo in the lslamic 
world.  The U.S. military can, however, fight terrorists in the traditional sense of 
the term.  By setting this as its true policy goal, the Pentagon will be creating a 
goal that is achievable.  “Fighting” does not imply always “winning,” but 
ultimately the American public will be more reassured when they see a limited 
and realistic policy pursued rather than seeing their military touting a military 
cum-political-economic-cultural-educational panacea that is highly likely to be an 
unmitigated failure.   
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